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THE NEWSPAPER BEFORE THE LAW.
Imbedded in the Constitution of every State of the Union and in
terms substantially identical, is a guaranty of the liberty of the press
and of the freedom of speech, invariably, I believe, coupled with- a
provision for responsibility in case of abuse.*
Yet, strangely enough, the proposition of Charles Pinckney of
South Carolina to insert such a clause into the Federal Constitution
was rejected, and it was not until the First Congress set about to
remedy the defects of the original instrument, that such a principle
was adopted as a part of the first amendment to the Constitution of
the United States. It is there provided that Congress shall make
no law "abridging the freedom of speech or of the press."
So essential a characteristic of Civil Liberty does this freedom
seem to us, that it is difficult to realize how modem is its growth and
how tremendous a struggle it involved between government and
press.
And yet it was as late as 1792 that Sampson Perry, editor of the
Argus, was tried and convicted of criminal libel in England, for
saying that "the House of Commons are not the real representa-
tives of the people."
And to this day it remains the parliamentary theory in Great
Britain that all reporting of its proceedings is a breach of privilege,
upon the singular ground that it tends to make members of parlia-
ment answerable to their constituencies, rather than to their con-
sciences. "
*That of Connecticut is found in Art. I. of the Constitution: "5 s. Every
citizen may freely speak; write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, be-
ing responsible for the abuse of that liberty. § 6. No law shall ever be passed
to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of the press."
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In this and in many other ways, the common law of England
relating to the law of libel and the supervision of the press remains
unchanged to this day. Yet prosecutions have all but ceased, for
public opinion is really the guaranty of freedom.
Press censorship originated in the Church of Rome, as being
necessary to the integrity of religion and to the protection of the
people against heretical teachings.
Pope Alexander VI. in 15Ol first announced the authority of
the Church over printed publications, and in 1515 the Fifth Council
of the Lateran formally decreed that no printed matter whatever
should issue except with the written sanction of the Bishop or of the
inquisitor of the diocese. This moral guardianship has been main-
tained by the Congregation of the Index.
At the Reformation, the Crown, in England, assumed the func-
tions of press censorship formerly exercised by the Roman Church.
In the very infancy of the art of printing it became apparent that
a free press was incompatible with absolute government, and the
history of the press down to the end of the I8th century is that of a
constant struggle between the government and the people, led and
represented by the press, toward freedom of thought and speech.
The period of the Commonwealth was one of comparative free-
dom, but Cromwell conceded the liberty of printing rather from
contempt of the power and influence of the press than from higher
motives. One of the first measures instituted after the Restoration,
was the suppression of the newspapers. A system of licensing was
adopted, which was not abolished until 1694.
Attention has been called to the fact that even at the time of the
Revolution of 1688 so little importance was attached to the influ-
ence of the press as a means of popular agitation and political re-
form, that no allusion to the liberty of the press was made either
in the Bill of Rights or in the Act of Settlement. The real develop-.
ment of the modern newspaper began at about this period, with the
refusal to re-enact the licensing law. But the publication of politi-
cal news remained for a long time illegal. The House of Commons
claimed for itself as a body and for its individual members, exemp-
tion from all criticism for official acts and conduct.
Different expedients were from time to time resorted to, to re-
tain control over the press. Heavy taxes were laid upon circulation
and upon advertisements, and the stamp duty was gradually in-
creased until in the reign of George III. it had risen to 4d for each
newspaper.
It was not until 1853 that the duty on advertisements was re-
moved, and in 1855 the stamp duty, then of id, was abolished.
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The attitude of the Colonial Governments in America toward
the press was no less severe.
Massachusetts in 1662 appointed two persons licensers of the
press, and prohibited any publications not supervised by them.
Even the laws were not at first published for general circulation.
When the magistrates of Massachusetts in 1649, yielding to pop-
ular demand, permitted them to be published, they did so under
protest, deeming it "a hazardous experiment."
The royal instructions to all of the colonial governors through-
out the colonial era contained this clause: "And forasmuch as great
inconvenience may arise by the liberty of printing within our prov-
ince, you are to provide by all necessary orders that no person keep
any press for printing, nor that any parhphlet, book, or other mat-
ters whatsoever be printed without your special leave and license
first obtained."
With the growth of popular intelligence and means of communi-
cation, and with the increased fullness in the development of
national and civic life, it was inevitable that both in this country and
in England many of the bonds which fettered the press should be
broken. Newspapers increased rapidly in numbers and in circula-
tion, and in so far as matters of general news and information
were concerned, the government relaxed its control, and the
contest resolved itself into a determination upon the part of the gov-
ernment to prevent the publication of political news and comment,
and on the part of the press to evade-or defy its restrictions.
This contest is intimately associated with-indeed, inseparably
connected &ith-the development of the law of criminal libel.
From the Restoration to 1729, newspaper reports of parlia-
mentary proceedings were unknown.
From that time on, numbers of printers were prosecuted every
session for printing fragments of parliamentary speeches. It was
the custom to do so as though they were imaginary, and designat-
ing their authors by initials or nicknames. The usual fine was
;ioo. -In 1764 one paper paid that sum for merely mentioning the
name of Lord Hereford. In that year 200 criminal informations
were filed against printers.
Popular sympathy led to the belief that the judges were too
harsh in their suppression of the discussion of public affairs, with
the natural result that juries were exceedingly lenient toward the
accused.
Parliament, no less than the Crown, showed extreme anxiety
to withdraw press cases from the control and cognizance of juries.
The House of Commons, in its determination to suppress the dis-
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cussion of public affairs, excepted libels from the list of offenses
covered by the parliamentary privileges of its members.
The Attorney-General, by the ex-offlcio information, was able to
bring libel cases to trial without previous indictment by the grand
jury.
The test of strength then came between the court and the jury;
the former declaring that the question of whether the subject mat-
ter was libelous or not was entirely one for the court, and that the
function of the jury was only to decide whether or not the publica-
tion had been made.
In 1770 Woodfall was tried for publishing the letters of Junius;
in particular that which accused the King of cowardice.
Lord Mansfield following in this respect a long list of eminent
judges, declared that the question of libel or no libel was for the
court.
To his charge the jury replied by a verdict of "Guilty of printing
and publishing only." This was at once set aside and a venire de
novo ordered,* but meanwhile Miller, who had reprinted the letter in
question, had been prosecuted and acquitted, to the unbounded
gratification of the public.
In its discomfiture the government abandoned the further trial
of Woodfall, and by its surrender was established the right of the
press to criticise the conduct, not merely of ministers of Parliament,
but of the King himself.
In 1792, largely through the influence of Lord Camden, Mr. Fox
caused to be passed an act entitled "An act to remove doubts re-
specting the functions of juries in cases of libel."
This was not by way of amendment, but was expressly stated
to be declaratory of the Common Law. It was declared that the
law of England had always been as advocated by Lord Camden, and
that in criminal proceedings the question of libel or no libel is for
the jury and not for the judge.
By this act, the battle was all but won.
There remained but one important change, which in this coun-
try was worked out mainly as the result of two famous trials for
libel; one in the Colony of New York, in 1735; the other also in
New York, after it had attained statehood, in i8o4.
It was a dictum of Lord Mansfield that in criminal prosecutions
for libel, "the greater the truth, the greater the libel."
By this was meant that the law took cognizance of the evil
effect of derogatory and offensive publications, as detrimental to
* Rex v. Woodfall, 5 Burr. 2661.
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government and as tending to provoke a breach of the peace, irre-
spective of their truth or falsity.
In case of a false defamatory statement, the civil courts were
open for redress, while in many cases of aggravated and unwar-
ranted and yet truthful attacks upon reputation, there was no means
of redress. The very impossibility of disproving the statement was
deemed likely to provoke to assault as the only means of vindica-
tion.
For this reason Courts would not even permit the truth to be
shown, if the publication were made with malice and without justi-
fication and were of a wanton, indecent or aggravating nature.
John Peter Zenger published in the columns of his New York
Weekly Journal, sbatires and criticisms upon the administration of
Governor William Crosby, which led to his arrest and prosecution
for criminal libel. His paper was ordered burned by the common
hangman, and for nine months he lay in prison before he could
obtain a trial. When it came Chief Justice De Lancey disbarred
Zenger's counsel for questioning the validity of the judge's com-
mission, and Andrew Hamilton, a noted lawyer of the day, came on
from Philadelphia to conduct the defense.
Zenger entered a plea of "not guilty, admitted the publication
and sought to justify it by proving its truth. The chief justice re-
fused to permit this and charged the jury that the publication was
libelous and that it was their duty to return a verdict of guilty.'
They soon brought in a verdict of not guilty.
Mr. Hamilton's address in defense of his client and in vindica-
tion of the liberties of the press, is deemed a classic.
In commenting upon this case, in a recent address, Hon. H. C.
Caldwell, presiding judge of the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, said:. "The verdict electrified the country.
Gouverneur Morris, one of the ablest and most sagacious statesmen
of the revolutionary period, dated -American liberty, not from the
Stamp Act of 1765, nor yet from the 'Boston Tea Party,' but from
the verdict of the jury in Zenger's case. The rendition of this ver-
dict constituted the immortalizing moment of those men's lives, and
is the richest heritage of their descendants. If the names of these
twelve patriots were at hand they would appear here. Their names
should go down in history with those of the foremost patriots of the
Revolution. This historic incident would not be complete, without
adding that the people bore Zenger's lawyer, Hamilton, out of the
court-room on their shoulders, and that the Common Council of
New York gave him the freedom of the city in a gold box for his
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gratuitous services in 'defense of the rights of mankind and the
liberty of the press.' "*
The other case, nearly seventy-five years later, was that of Harry
Croswell, who was indicted in 18o4 for a libel upon President
Jefferson.t This led to a change in the law of New York, by
statutory enactment, permitting the truth to be given in evidence in
all criminal prosecutions for libel.
Alexander Hamilton, in this case, made one of the most brilliant
oratorical efforts of his life, and his definition of criminal libel in
connection with political offenses, is now the accepted doctrine in
all of the States.
"Nothing is a libel which is written and published from good
motives and for justifiable ends; and to show this, the truth of the
facts charged as libelous may be given in evidence, and this whether
against public measures, public officers or private citizens."
In nearly every one, if not all of the States, the victory won was
guaranteed by constitutional provisions, of which that of New York
of 1821 is typical, and perhaps the most clearly stated.
"Every citizen may freely write, speak and publish his senti-
ments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right,
and no law shall be passed to restrain the liberty of speech or of
the press. In all prosecutions or indictments for libels, the truth
may be given in evidence to the jury, and if it shall appear to the
jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published
with good "motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be ac-
.quitted, and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and
the fact.
Incomplete as this outline historical sketch .may be, it perhaps
may give us a fair understanding of the present law of criminal libel
and of the responsibility of the newspaper to the sovereignty.
The freedom of the press means at least this, that it is to be
exempt from censorship, and may publish what it deems proper,
being responsible only for the abuse of that privilege.
Censorship as a war measure, and based upon matters of State
and public expediency, will be accepted by most persons as a justi-
fiable exception.
We have seen to what extent the newspaper is accountable to
the sovereign power of the State for the abuse of the privilege of
• "Trial by Judge and Jury," an address before the Missouri State Bar As-
sociation, 6o Albany Law Journal, p. 39. The names of the jurors were fur-
nished through the courtesy of Mr. Newman Erb, and appear in a note on
page 4o, with a reference to the pamphlet containing a report of the trial.
t People v. Croswell-3 Johnson's Cases, 336.
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free publication. But in addition to this, there is a further account-
ability to the person defamed, to be enforced in a civil action for
damage to his reputation. A totally different theory prevails here
from that which pervades the criminal law.
The liability is based upon the presumption that every man is
entitled to such reputation and standing in the community aa he
may deserve, and that no man is legally entitled to defend an ill-
gotten reputation, and that the publication of the truth can never
result in a legal injury to him. While, on the one hand, the criminal
law at one time would not even permit the truth of defamatory mat-
ter to be shown in evidence, on the other hand, in the civil courts
proof of the truth of the matter published is invariably a complete
defense to the action. There are, indeed, traces of an earlier doc-
trine more closely akin to that of the criminal law permitting the
truth to be proved, but only in mitigation of damages, but I believe
that there is now no exception to the rule which I have just stated,
and which permits a newspaper to publish anything whatsoever of
a person, with whatsoever motive, without responsibility, in a private
action for damages, provided it is prepared when called upon to
prove the truth of the charge.
But this truth must always be specially set up as a defense by
the defendant in his pleadings, and must be proved by a preponder-
ance of evidence upon the trial. If this is not done, the truth may
still in some cases be proved to rebut actual malice and mitigate the
damages, but cannot bar the action. In this respect the law ex-
tends to the press the fullest possible liberty of publication, holding
it responsible merely for the abuse of that privilege.
But in a great many cases-and I do not say this in contempt
of the morality of the journalist-the statement complained of is
not true. What, then, are the respective positions of the newspaper
and its victim?
The full and free discussion of all public affairs and of all trials
and proceedings of legislative, executive and judicial bodies, is
privileged; provided, however, that in case of judicial proceedings
they are not ex parte, and do not hinder and obstruct the Court in
its performance of its judicial duties, and thereby amount to a con-
tempt of Court.
The publication of ex parte proceedings is not privileged, says
Judge Cooley (Cooley on Torts, p. 258), because it "tends to poison
the source of justice and to prejudge those whom the law still pre-
sumes to be innocent."
But in the discussion of ordinary matters of news, there is no
privilege accorded to the press by the common law. For the false
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and malicious publication of matter derogatory to reputation, either
damaging per se or because of peculiar circumstances, there exists
a civil liability for such damages as the jury may see fit to award,
not, of course, exceeding the amount demanded in the complaint.
These may be intended as actual damages, the assessment of which
must, of course, rest in the discretion of the jury, from the nature of
the case, or, in extreme cases of wanton and malicious publications,
exemplary damages or smart money may be included. As to a very
large portion of a newspaper's contents, therefore, in relation par-
ticularly to matters of local gossip and private affairs, no privilege
exists, unless especially conferred by statute.
Of late years, however, statutes have been enacted in a very large
number, perhaps all, of the States, whose purpose it is to extend to
the newspaper an additional privilege with respect to such news, if
published in good faith, and without malice. In all such cases it is
incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove malice as a matter of fact,
and it is no longer to be inferred, as in general it is, or may be, from
the falsity and derogatory nature of the language used. The Con-
necticut statute, Sec. 1116, reads as follows:
"In every action for a libel, the defendant may give proof of in-
tention; and unless the plaintiff shall prove either malice in fact, or
that the defendant, after having been requested by him in writing
to retract the libelous charge, in as public a manner as that in which
it was made, failed to do so within a reasonable time, he shall re-
cover nothing but such actual damage as he may have specially
alleged and proved."
In common speech this means that the plaintiff can recover no
more than his actual damage unless he can prove unjustifiable pub-
lication or a failure to retract, upon demand.
In the case of Arnott v. The Standard Association, 57 Conn., p.
86, the Court said that this statute was enacted in the interest of
publishers of newspapers, and intended to furnish them a measure
of protection in the publication of current news, criticisms upon
public men and measures, and comments upon matters of public in-
terest. It gave the defendant a right to prove in justification that
the publication was intended merely as an item of news or. of fair
and just criticism upon men and measures, and if he could make
such proof, the plaintiff could recover nothing but such actual
damage as he might have alleged and proved, unless either there
was a refusal to retract upon written request, or the plaintiff was
able to prove actual malice or malice in fact. In that particular case
the libelous matter complained of was this: "Mr. Eaton might en-
dorse a person, and he would be more likely to do so than not, but
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he would not willingly endorse a thief, a jail-bird or a sneak like
Arnott." The defendant set up by way of "proof of intention" that
by a mistake in punctuation, and a failure to insert a comma after
the word jail-bird, it was made to appear that all such epithets were
intended to apply to Arnott, but such was not the intent of the pub-
lishers. This explanation was doubtless satisfactory to the jury, for
a verdict was given to the defendant, and the Supreme Court held
that it was not erroneous.
With the enormous expansion of the number and the circulation
of newspapers, and with the occasional recklessness of the reporter
on the scent of a sensation, it is not in the least surprising that the
columns of the press are plentifully sprinkled with the seed of litiga-
tion, and yet the number of libel suits is astonishingly small. Why
is this? The answer would seem to be this: The public has become
so accustomed to the unreliability of press statements, whether
through error, political warfare or spite, as to give them little heed,
and to well understand that no public man can possibly remain free
from vilification. It is also well understood that in large numbers
of cases such false statements have little tendency to injure, and are
readily discounted in advance. No public man can devote his
whole life to the prosecution of libel suits, and yet, if he once began,
he could do nothing else. It has come to be regarded undignified
to seek redress at law, and the man would subject himself to the
ridicule of the community should he take seriously the abuse which
is heaped upon him.
The overwhelming volume of the newspaper circulation of the
country contains in itself a better remedy for this abuse. The most
outrageous libels upon a member of one party are matched by
equally untrue praises in t1 e organs of the other; and the bewildered
people know not what to believe, and believe nothing. Now and
then there may be a libel so gross or touching one so exclusively
in his private or family life, that he feels bound to resort to the
courts, and occasionally an enormous verdict is given the plaintiff,
but usually he is very glad to get his six cents. Such a verdict as
this, while perhaps not generally so regarded, is really a contempt-
uous reflection upon the influence of the defendant newspaper, for
good or for evil.
It may be said in general that an injunction will not issue to
restrain the printing and publication of a threatened libel, though
there are some exceptions where the threatened publication would
be injurious to property; and there are some instances in which
courts have issued orders in the nature of injunctions to prohibit
the publication of testimony prior to the decision of the cause. (Am.
HeinOnline  -- 9 Yale L.J. 11 October,1899-July1900
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
& Eng. Enc., Injunction, p. 896.) It is intimated that the courts
have power in this way to prevent the publication of pending judi-
cial proceedings. (Note to State v. Galloway, 98 Am. Dec., p. 419,
and cases.)
Such a remedy is, however, very rarely adopted, as there are
other means of enforcing compliance equally efficacious. The Court
may feel bound, from the nature of the testimony or of the case, in
the interest of public morals, or to avoid local prejudice or
demonstration, to prohibit the publication of testimony. In some
jurisdictions this may be done either by an order excluding the pub-
lic from the court room, or by an order prohibiting or regulat-
ing the publication, declaring a violation of the order to be con-
tempt. In such a-case its violation may sometimes be so punished.
But the most satisfactory method of control is by non-interference,
and a punishment for contempt if the privilege of fair discussion is
abused.
A considerable branch of the law as to contempt of court is of
recent growth, and is rapidly developing, having to do with news-
paper publications in relation to the dignified and orderly conduct
of the judicial business of the country. Contempts are divided into
two general classes; civil and criminal. While agreeing upon the
classification, courts are not agreed as to the location of the division
line. Speaking generally, the former have to do merely with the
violation of orders of court injurious to the adverse party, as in the
case of disobedience of injunctions, orders in relation to alimony,
mandamus proceedings, etc. Attachment for contempt is also the
way by which a court of equity enforces its decree. While a court
of law grants an execution, a court of chancery issues an order re-
quiring some act or omission of the party. As there is no way in
which this conduct may be compelled, the court must needs con-
tent itself with the personal punishment by fine or imprisonment
for the violation of the order.
Criminal contempts, however, have to do with any and all acts
which, in or out of the presence of the court, hinder, obstruct or
impede its functions.* Actual contempts of the authority of the
court by rude, insulting or disorderly conduct while the court is
in session, do not as a rule present any interesting or difficult ques-
tions of law. Another classification is into direct and constructive
contempts.
* "Generally, it may be said that a criminal contempt embraces all acts
committed against the majesty of the law, and the primary purpose of their
punishment is the vindication of public authority." 7 Am. and Eng. Encyl.
of Law, 2d Ed. 28.
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There are, however, in all cases of contempts, certain peculiari-
ties of procedure which render them a terror to the offender.
Of necessity the court whose dignity is insulted must have the
power of summary disposition of the cause, and must itself pass
upon it. The offender is, indeed, entitled to be heard in his defense,
and an apology is frequently accepted, but the court possesses the
power summarily to punish by fine and imprisonment, and the judge
to whom the insult has been personally offered is hardly in the posi-
tion of a disinterested tribunal; although it must be said that the
very delicacy of the position of the court gives rise to the utmost
caution in exercising this terrific power, and instances of its abuse
are very rare.
A still more peculiar characteristic is that at common law (and
the same is in general true to-day in the absence of statute), no right
of appeal existed in contempt cases, nor could the question of the
action of the court be reviewed in any way. There are some excep-
tions to this rule, where the question of whether the act done con-
stitutes a contempt, is submitted to the court as a question of law.*
Nor can the question be raised by a writ of habeas corpus, unless the
judge has exceeded his jurisdiction. If he is within his jurisdiction,
the judgment is valid, and if valid, no relief can be had upon habeas
corpus. The law will not permit the question to be reviewed in that
or in any other way, if within the jurisdiction of the court.
The party is entitled to be heard, though only in proper person
and not by counsel. The severity of this rule, however, is now
generally relaxed. There is no right of trial by jury: The accused
is given the right to purge himself of the contempt, by his answers,
and in many States his answer under oath is conclusive as to the
meaning and purpose of the acts done or language used.
This brings me to a very important branch of our subject; the
responsibility of a newspaper to the court, under process for con-
tempt. It is, of course, clear that a newspaper publication cannot
be a contempt of court in the sense in which the term has heretofore
been used, and the contempt, if it exists, is what is known as the
constructive contempt, or, as it is sometimes said, contempt of cburt
out of court. Interference with property in custodia legis; suing a
receiver without leave of court, etc., are other instances of construc-
tive or indirect contempts.
I shall briefly discuss the principles which the most recent cases
have adopted in dealing with this subject, in order to indicate the
limitations upon the power of the press to criticise the courts and
*Tyler v. Hamersley, 44 Conn. 393-6.
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their doings, and to show how the Government, through its judicial
branch, has regained a very substantial part of the power which
formerly rested to a greater extent with the executive or legislative
department.
Simple as these principles are as legal propositions, their ap-
plication is sometimes exceedingly difficult, where an attempt must
be made to fix the boundaries beyond which the public press may
not go in publications respecting judges and judicial proceedings;
and, on the other hand, beyond which the judges and the courts
may not go in restraining the freedom of the press and in punish-
ing it as for improper interference with these proceedings, or for
bringing them into unmerited contempt.
In addition to the power to punish any disorderly, tumultuous
or disrespectful conduct in its presence, the court is also clothed
with the inherent power to punish any act or publication which is
calculated to disturb the business of the court, to impair its useful-
ness, to interfere with its orders or process, or which tends to bring
it into disrespect or contempt. These powers, it is conceded, so far
as constitutional courts are concerned, not only do not owe their
existence to legislative action, but they are not subject to destruc-
tion by the legislative power, although their exercise may be regu-
lated. This, at least, is the doctrine with respect to contempts in
the presence of the court, and to interference with its process.
Implied in the very existence of the court is the power to compel
orderly and respectful proceedings and demeanor on the part
of all persons coming into its presence; obedience to its judg-
ments and mandates, and the refraining from all acts and words
which may tend to pollute the administration of justice, or which
may discredit the courts and judges by imputing to them dishonor-
able motives in the discharge of their duties. Courts must have the
power to protect and vindicate themselves and the honor of their
judges and officials.
With respect, however, to courts owing their existence to legis-
lative action, the right to punish for contempt may be abridged.*
It is usual to divide alleged contempts of courts by newspapers
and their publications into two classes: those in which it is claimed
that the object of the publication was to affect, or its tendency was
naturally to affect, the decision of a pending cause; and the other
class including those whose apparent purpose is to bring the courts
or their judges or other essential officers into discredit.
As to the first class of cases, any publication pending a trial,
7 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 32.
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whose object is to influence or terrorize either judges, prosecuting
officers, jurors, grand jurors, witnesses, or parties, constitutes most
clearly a contempt of ccurt. Where, however, the case is once de-
cided, the capacity for this particular evil ceases, and it is a matter
of much more difficulty to make out a case of contempt. Such pub-
lications are apt to take the form of a comment upon the conduct
of the judges or jurors, and it becomes a matter of the utmost deli-
cacy to decide whether the proper punishment is by way of a suit
or prosecution for libel at the instance of the judge, or whether the
attack is upon the dignity of the Court as such, so as to hinder, im-
pede or obstruct it in the proper performance of its public duties.
It may be said in general that it is the tendency of modern de-
cisions, where the comment bears no relation to the cause then
pending, to regard the reflections as rather upon the character of the
individual judge than upon the function and dignity of the Court.
Where, however, the matter does or may affect a pending case, the
arm of the law is long, and will reach the publisher of any matter
the tendency of which is pernicious.
And yet we are not without decisions authorizing commitment
for contempt, even for comment upon past proceedings, either based
upon the common law or upon special statute.*
So far as I know, the question of the extent to which a news-
paper may lawfully comment upon the proceedings of a court has
never come up before the highest court of Connecticut, and only
one case has come to my notice in which the right has been ques-
tioned. In that instance the accused were allowed to purge them-
selves of contempt and were dismissed with a caution.
A tew words in relation to two or three of the most recent cases
may perhaps serve to illustrate the most important features of this
doctrine in practice. A few years ago the divorce suit of Price v.
Price was on trial in California, and the court was advised that the
evidence would probably be of such a nature that all persons should
be excluded from the court room during the progress of the suit.
Such an urder was passed by the court, and it was further ordered
"that no public report or publication of any character of the testi-
mony in the case be made." The next day Mr. Shortridge, editor
of the San Jose Mercury, published an article referring to the order
of the court, and containing what purported to be the testimony of
the witnesses. He was summoned to appear and show cause why
he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt.' In his answer he
disclaimed any intention of reflecting upon the court, or of show-
* State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384.
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ing any disrespect for it, and claimed that in publishing a fair and
true report of the testimony and proceedings he was simply exercis-
ing a constitutional right with which the court could not interfere,
by order or otherwise. He was, nevertheless, judged guilty of con-
tempt of court, and ordered to pay a fine of $ioo. The Supreme
Court of the State (in re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526), in a carefully con-
sidered opinion, ruled that the statute which permitted the court
to direct a trial in divorce cases to be private, and to exclude the
public from the court room, did not go so far as to permit an order
that no public report of the testimony should be made. There was,
therefore, no liability for contempt in making such a publication.
As this report contained no reflection upon the judge and nothing
to intimidate any witnesses, or other persons connected with the
trial, it could not constitute a contempt of court, even though the
court had forbidden its publication, and if the publication could
not have interfered with the full and fair investigation of the merits
of the case, no contempt could have been committed. The proceed-
ings of the lower court were therefore annulled.
Another recent case,* decided in the fall of 1897, involved the
question of how far a judge who was a candidate for re-election
could go in the direction of punishing as for contempt the publica-
tion of newspaper articles reflecting upon his impartiality and hon-
esty in the trial of cases already disposed of. Judge Bailey was a
candidate for re-election, his term expiring in January, 1898, and
the election was to take place on the 6th of April, 1897. During the
month of March Judge Bailey was engaged in holding court, and
on the I ith of that month an article was published charging the
judge with being extravagant in the management of the court, with
being partial and unfair in respect to his official conduct in the trial
of causes, and with being' influenced by corrupt motives. The
authors and publishers of the articles were summoned before Judge
Bailey, and after a few continuances of a few hours each, an alterna-
tive writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court was served upon
Judge Bailey, prohibiting him from taking further cognizance of
the contempt proceedings. He therefore stayed those proceedings,
but adjudged the parties guilty of a new contempt in the presence
of the court, by reason of their filing an affidavit alleging the truth
of the original articles published by them. It being adjudged by
the Supreme Court that both of these proceedings for contempt were
in excess of the jurisdiction of the court, the writ of prohibition was
made absolute. The argument was pressed that such publications
* State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Circuit Court of Eau Claire Co., 97 Wis. I.
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as were the subject of investigation tended to diminish the respect
due to the court in the trial of future causes, and thus impair its
usefulness; but it was said, this doctrine is certainly extreme. Car-
ried to its ultimate conclusion it would call for the punishment
of any adverse criticism on the official conduct of the sitting judge,
and absolutely prevent all public or private discussion of court pro-
ceedings. It is true, Judge Bailey was a candidate for re-election,
but if he had been a candidate for any other office than that of judge,
it would not for a moment be claimed that the publications in ques-
tion would afford ground for any other legal action than an action
for libel in the regular course of the law. But the claim was made,
that because he was a judge and was holding court at the time, such
unfavorable criticism of his past actions may be summarily pun-
ished by the judge himself as for contempt. "Truly," says the
court, "it must be a grievous and weighty necessity which will jus-
tify so arbitrary a proceeding, whereby a candidate for office be-
comes the accuser, judge and jury, and may within a few hours
summarily punish his critic by imprisonment."
The penalties of the law have generally fallen upon the indi-
viduals who have personally taken part in the writing or printing
of the objectionable matter. But in January, 1899, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a corporation, as the
proprietor of a newspaper, might be adjudged guilty of contempt
and punished by a fine, though of course not, in the nature of things,
by imprisonment. And this, too, under circumstances quite start-
ling at first sight. A case was upon trial before the Superior Court,
for the assessment of damages to one Loring for land taken for
public purposes by the town of Holden. The Telegram, in com-
menting upon the the case, said: "The town offered Loring $go at
the time of the taking, but he demanded $25
o , and, not getting it,
went to law."
Words to the same effect were also published by the Gazette.
These came to the notice of the presiding justice, who, of his own
motion issued a summons in the name of the court to the managers
of the papers, to show cause why the corporations should not be
punished for contempt of court. Upon their appearance and after
hearing, a fine of $ioo was imposed upon each corporation. The
cases were taken up by writs of error and the judgments affirmed.
A number of questions of practice were disposed of, and it was held
that the publications tended to obstruct justice and prevent a fair
trial, and so constituted contempts of court. That evidence of such
an attempt to compromise would be inadmissible, is obvious. It is
equally clear that if these facts came to the knowledge of the jurors,
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they would have a tendency to prejudice them against the plaintiff,
while the very fact that the publications came to the attention of
the judge, was evidence of the probability of their reaching the
jurors, and of their capacity for mischief.
It was held, too, that an execution was a proper way by which
to reach the corporations' property, in case the fines were not wil-
lingly paid.
In the same State, and at about the same time, Torrey G.
Wardner, the editor of the Boston Traveler, was convicted of con-
tempt and imprisoned for publishing serious reflections upon the
conduct of the trial of D. W. Getchell, an engineer of the N. Y., N.
H. & H. R. R. Co., who was convicted of manslaughter for causing
the accident at Sharon Station, whereby several passengers lost their
lives.
Threats of an appeal were made, but acting under the advice of
friends and counsel, Wardner apologized, purged himself of the
contempt, and was released.
I have thus called attention, though with no attempt at -an ex-
haustive statement of all the problems solved or to be solved, to
the safeguards which surround the constitutional right of the
press to freedom, as well as the limitations upon the abuse of that
freedom and its degeneration into license. These, in turn, constitute
the safeguards of the freedom of individual character and reputa-
tion, and of the free and unimpeded exercise of their proper func-
tions by the judicial, executive and legislative departments of gov-
ernment.
This brief history of the newspaper before the law shows-many
extraordinary changes in their relations toward each other.
Macauley goes so far as to say: "No sooner had the press been
emancipated from government censorship than the government
itself fell under the censorship of the press."
Without quite conceding this, we have at last worked out a
fairly satisfactory definition of that vague term. "The Liberty of the
Press"-so often and so unreasonably appealed to as a shield against
responsibility for abuse and vituperation, and the language of Alex-
ander Hamilton is both comprehensive and accurate when he says:
"The liberty of the press consists in the right to publish, with im-
punity, truth, with good motives, and for-justifiable ends, whether
it respects government, magistracy or individuals."
GEORGE D. WATROUS.
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